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*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

25X1A9a TO : Mr. [REDACTED]  
 FROM : Advisor for Management  
 SUBJECT: Attached Progress Report.

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DATE: 14 November 1951

1. The continuity of the report appears to be good. It covers the fields which might best be termed "subject to critical analysis".

2. As a suggestion, I feel that a critical editorial effort could reduce the wordage probably by several pages, and offer this comment with the full knowledge that this is "first draft form" and that you and undoubtedly [REDACTED] will do a final editing job 25X1A9a

3. There are several statements made, indicated by red check marks and penciled annotations, where I feel that an inaccuracy is recorded. I make these comments with the belief that some of the personnel of the Bureau of the Budget would know they are inaccurate. For example, on page 22 of your report, you state that operational planning existed without proper consideration of logistical support, which is true, but goes on to say by the establishment of a Project Review Committee, etc., this was immeasurably improved. The PRC has existed in CIA for several years with very much the same mission it has now. Granted that the PRC is now of a higher caliber because of the three Deputy membership and that there has been some clarification as to its mission, however, someone in the Budget Bureau could pick this up as an incorrect statement, and it might damage the value of the report.

4. On page 6, the red mark indicates what I believe to be a questionable sentence. It might raise the question of whether certain other senior individuals now on duty in CIA are in fact qualified intelligence officers, or again it might raise the question as to whether a very senior official has to be qualified in intelligence work to be a superior supervisor. The statement as made would imply that Admiral Hillenkoetter was not qualified in intelligence work. I believe this could be subject to question. I believe the inference we are trying to make is that the Deputy or Executive Deputy were not qualified in intelligence work, and there again as of the date of this report, that to me might be a questionable statement. I simply raise this question again to be sure that we do not make statements which could be shot at one way or another.

5. Page 16. I suggest rewording of the marked paragraph purely on the psychological basis. It might tend to invite examination.

6. Page 19. I question the marked portion purely from the standpoint of lack of understanding of the statement. Perhaps rewording

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would make it clearer. I doubt if it is correct to say there are levels of security standards in CIA. I think of it rather as security within security. Recommend we not compare one as lower versus higher.

7. Page 23. It may be subject to interpretation, but I would not interpret it as OPC ever completely independent of CIA. I know OPC has a strong feeling along those lines, but ever under Admiral Hillenkoetter, they never operated as completely independent.

8. We have attached the charts redrawn in pencil, which we hope will be a little more useable. The old charts are being returned as in several instances we did a redesign job in order to make the chart presentable. These charts should have further analysis before final use, and we will be happy to lend any assistance desired.

9. If any of the above is not clear, perhaps we could get together for a discussion.



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Attachments.

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# MISSING PAGE

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT MISSING PAGE(S):

Attachments